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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Remarkable advances in engineering and system 
controls in recent times and the consequent devel-
opment of state-of-the-art technologies are clearly 
resulting in economic, environmental and safety 
benefits to the society. Latest disasters, however, put 
human error in the glare of the media spotlight. The 
February 2016 train collision in southern Bavaria, 
Germany, which took 11 lives and left more than 90 
people injured, is one of several examples where 
human errors appear to have played a significant role 
in a major accident. Despite the fact that investiga-
tions are still ongoing and a final report has not been 
issued, the chief prosecutor anticipated that a local 
controller opened the track to two trains simultane-
ously, and his erroneous actions had catastrophic 
consequences (BBC, 2016). The railway system has 
multiple safety barriers in place, such as an automat-
ic braking system if a train crosses a stop signal, but 
the track controller had reportedly disabled it. When 
he recognised the error and tried to warn the drivers, 
it was too late.  
It is clear that the designed safety features were 
not sufficient to minimise the possibility of human 
error, even if investigators rule out technical prob-
lems and equipment failures. A head-on collision in-
volving two trains is obviously a critical scenario, 
which should have been avoided by multiple safety 
barriers (track control, signalling system, automatic 
stoppage etc). If a single track controller is capable 
of interfering with the technology by overriding all 
barriers at once, there might be serious issues with 
the conception of the system: i.e. safety barriers 
should be independent, and if they can be simultane-
ously deactivated, they should have been considered 
as a single barrier, in a general design perspective. 
Moreover, previous work involving the statistical 
analysis of major accidents (Moura et al, 2016) has 
shown that around 73% of the erroneous actions 
identified during in-depth investigations were com-
bined with some kind of design shortcoming to gen-
erate a catastrophic outcome. The link between hu-
man errors and design failures became apparent, as 
well as the indication that an effective design man-
agement strategy that considers human behaviour 
could be crucial to reduce the chances of having a 
major accident such as the rail accident previously 
described. 
The idea of human-centred design (Boy, 2013; 
Kurosu, 2011) placed the human being as a critical 
component in the design considerations, taking into 
account the psychological and physiological charac-
teristics, along with the technology and the opera-
tional environment. In an objective way, it is not the 
operators that will need to adapt to the systems, but 
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systems will have to be suited to the users’ needs. 
However, the scarcity of human performance data in 
complex systems is a well-known limitation (Moura 
et al., 2015a; Swain, 1990) to the development of an 
effective design strategy. Collecting data and gener-
ating means to prevent major accidents is a challeng-
ing effort, especially if systemic events are priori-
tised over the more trivial ergonomic and 
occupational accidents such as slips, trips and falls.     
Therefore, further investigation into the interac-
tions between humans, technologies and organisa-
tions through the detailed analysis of historical data 
may disclose reasonable clues on the genesis of hu-
man errors.  
Previous research comprised data generated from 
occupational to serious accidents (Bellamy, 2007, 
2013) or limited the domain to a single industry 
(Baysari et al, 2008; Evans, 2011). Conversely, the 
current research encompassed major accidents from 
different industries (e.g. oil & gas upstream, refiner-
ies, aviation, nuclear and transportation). All events 
were thoroughly scrutinised by investigation teams 
in the search for causes, and the information provid-
ed is very detailed and reliable. The aim is to expose 
the intricate conditions leading to these rare events, 
giving some indications on how to tackle human fac-
tors issues by improving design, in terms of suitabil-
ity and prevention of erroneous actions. 
2 BACKGROUND 
 
Moura et al. (2016) have translated a collection of 
238 major accident reports from different industrial 
backgrounds into a common framework, in order to 
make the data comparable. The reports were ob-
tained from regulators, internal investigations con-
ducted by industry, independent investigation com-
missions and insurance companies, containing very 
detailed descriptions of the triggering events and 
contributing factors to the events. The complete list 
of reporting entities and further details on the con-
struction of the dataset can be found in Moura et al. 
(2015a).  
Different contributing factors derived from 
Hollnagel’s (1998) Contextual Control Model used 
as basis for the Cognitive Reliability and Error 
Analysis Mode (CREAM) were identified and tabu-
lated, resulting in the construction of the Multi-
attribute Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-
D).  
The dataset contains a Boolean representation (i.e. 
presence or absence) of 53 contributing factors in the 
lower level of the hierarchy, which are distributed 
between 15 different classes. These are all linked to 
3 major categories: Man, Technology and Organisa-
tion. Having the factors identified for each one of the 
accidents, statistical analyses as well as the applica-
tion of data mining approaches were made possible. 
Previous research applied different methods to 
disclose relevant associations within the MATA-D 
dataset.  
Moura et al (2015b) successfully used in earlier 
versions of the dataset an unsupervised artificial neu-
ral networks approach. As a result, a relationship be-
tween design failures and the lack of training was in-
itially found, which influenced erroneous 
interpretations and action failures. In addition, a 
general configuration for human errors in industrial 
accidents was developed, disclosing some organisa-
tional factors disturbing human cognitive functions. 
Moreover, Doell et al (2015) also tested associa-
tion rule mining techniques on both the lower (53 
factors) and the intermediate (15 factors) hierarchical 
levels of the MATA-D dataset, aiming at the identi-
fication of relevant links among contributing factors. 
Attributes that occurred infrequently had to be ex-
cluded from the analysis, due to limitations in the 
extraction of association rules, but these were as-
sessed separately. Links between action failures and 
specific cognitive functions; wrong reasoning and 
inadequate task allocation; and design failures and 
insufficient knowledge were identified. 
A tailored Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering 
method (Moura et al, 2015c) was also applied to 202 
of the 216 events that were in the dataset at the time 
of the analysis. It was necessary to leave single-
cause accidents out of the analysis, as these would 
appear as outliers.  In that work, the clustering fo-
cused on the intermediate level of the MATA-D da-
taset hierarchy (action error, specific cognitive func-
tions, temporary person related functions, permanent 
person related functions, equipment, procedures, 
temporary interface, permanent interface, communi-
cation, organisation, training, ambient conditions 
and working conditions) and a relationship between 
specific cognitive functions and the deadliest group 
of accidents was suggested. 
Previous work using MATA-D (Doell et al., 2015; 
Moura et al.,2015b, 2015c) concentrated on finding 
the most relevant factors and disclosing key relation-
ships among them, by applying a number of data 
mining approaches to the Boolean data contained in 
earlier versions of the proprietary dataset. Now, the 
objective is to go beyond the binary information ap-
praisal, using a clustering approach as a pre-
processing technique, and then revealing specific 
features in the design lifecycle, which might have 
led to the most serious consequences to human life. 
3 ANALYSIS METHOD 
 
The MATA-D dataset version presented by Moura et 
al. (2016), which contains 238 major accidents, was 
subjected to an unsupervised learning neural net-
work approach entitled self-organising maps (SOM) 
(Kohonen, 2001). SOM has been used in many dif-
ferent data mining applications, where visualisation 
of high-dimensional data is required (Kohonen, 
2013; Ultsch, 1993). The intention was to have the 
data reorganised in the output space by accidents’ 
similarity, using as input data the 53 possible con-
tributing factors for each single event, i.e. a matrix 
238 x 53.  
Basically, the method (Kohonen, 2001) involves 
the training of the neural network according to 
   (1) 
where v(t) = the minimum distance between the in-
put vector x (t) and a node mi in the output space.   
Then, the convergence of the output space is ob-
tained through the batch-learning version of the al-
gorithm (Eq. 2), as recommended by Kohonen 
(2013) for practical applications.  
    (2) 
where mi* = best matching node;  = x(t) mean val-
ue; nj = number of samples; and hji = neighbourhood 
of the mi.  
The output provided by the application of the Ko-
honen algorithm described above results in a 2-D ar-
ray, ordered in a topographic arrangement where 
similar accidents (considering the occurrence of the 
contributing factors) are aggregated in one of the 
four clusters (Fig. 1). The expert version of the Vis-
covery® SOMine software was used to generate 
graphs. 
Having the accidents ordered by similarity, the 
statistical analysis of the resulting clusters (presented 
in Table 1) revealed important features, which were 
used as criteria to define the group(s) of interest. 
Therefore, portions of the map where the worst con-
sequences of the accidents were observed could be 
highlighted for further consideration, using the fa-
talities rate as a metric.  
Once the cluster of interest has been defined, rele-
vant relationships between design failures, human 
factors and technology were exposed, presenting the 
factors which contributed to the accidents with the 
most disastrous consequences. Further data from the 
MATA-D dataset were then retrieved, bringing into 
light the detailed descriptions of the design failures 
for the evaluated cluster, and the interaction of these 
shortcomings with other relevant aspects had been 
explained. 
The data mining effort continued by the identifica-
tion of the design lifecycle stage where the failures 
were most likely produced, also identifying the dis-
ciplines which improvements would generate a ben-
efit in terms of safety, by assisting the prevention of 
human errors. 
The findings served as a basis for the development 
of a general framework, intended to provide design-
ers and reviewers with some guidance on how to 
identify and tackle possible gaps and shortcomings 
during the design stage. 
4 RESULTS 
 
Figure 1 represents the clustering results of the MA-
TA-D dataset, using the self-organising maps. Table 
1 shows the number of accidents, the fatalities rate 
and the frequency of all identified factors per cluster, 
presenting all characteristics of the resulting group-
ings.  
Accidents involving design failures were mostly 
grouped in Cluster 3, where design issues appeared 
in 87.2% of the featured accidents, and in Cluster 1, 
where 85% of the accidents presented a design fault 
as a contributing factor. Quality control problems 
were also highlighted in both clusters 1 and 3, with 
81.3% and 79.5%, respectively. Furthermore, train-
ing aspects (insufficient skills, with 56.3% and 
76.9%, and insufficient knowledge, with 60% and 
56.4%) were significant in the two clusters. 
 
Figure 1. MATA-D Clustering Results using SOM 
 
Nonetheless, major accidents are considered to be 
rare events, resulting from a complex interaction of 
numerous aspects (Reason, 1997). Therefore, in spite 
of having some similarities, the genesis of the major 
accidents affected by design failures, largely repre-
sented by Clusters 1 and 3, lies in dissimilar groups 
of human, technological and organisational factors.  
Action errors in Cluster 1 were largely identified 
as a failure to perform a sequence of actions (wrong 
place), appearing in 52.5% of the cluster accidents. 
Conversely, human errors identified in Cluster 3 
were mainly wrong time (41%) and wrong type 
(30.8%). Accidents in Cluster 3 also posed more 
complex challenges to the human cognitive func-
tions, as a significant failure in the operators’ mental 
plan was identified in many cases – 25.6% of inade-
quate plan and 15.4% of priority error.    
From a technological perspective, Cluster 1 acci-
dents were influenced by inadequate procedures 
(78.7%) and incomplete information from the inter-
face (36.2%), while Cluster 3 accidents were severe-
ly affected by equipment failures, with 94.9% of in-
cidence.  
There is also a significant contrast between organ-
isational aspects within these two clusters. Cluster 1 
noteworthy genotypes included a very significant 
contribution of the inadequate task allocation factor, 
with 95% of incidence, along with maintenance fail-
ure (56.3%) and missing information (37.5%). In-
stead, factors in Cluster 3 that were significantly 
above the overall incidence average were manage-
ment problem (23.1%) and communication failure 
(20.5%).   
The 53 factors extracted from the CREAM 
framework are listed and divided by Human Factors 
(erroneous actions, observation, interpretation, plan-
ning, temporary person-related functions and perma-
nent person-related functions); Technology (equip-
ment failure, procedures, temporary interface 
problems and permanent interface problems) and 
Organisation (organisational issues, training, ambi-
ent conditions and working conditions). 
 
















Wrong Time 13.8% 10.5% 41.0% 3.2% 
Wrong Type 11.3% 7.0% 30.8% 4.8% 
Wrong Object 3.7% 3.5% 2.6% 0.0% 
Wrong Place 52.5% 36.8% 12.8% 11.3% 
Observation Missed 20.0% 12.3% 23.1% 8.1% 
False Observation 6.3% 3.5% 0.0% 1.6% 
Wrong Identification 5.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 
Faulty Diagnosis 26.3% 8.8% 12.8% 0.0% 
Wrong Reasoning 20.0% 1.8% 25.6% 0.0% 
Decision error 5.0% 17.5% 17.9% 1.6% 
Interpretation delay 8.7% 1.8% 7.7% 0.0% 
Incorrect Prediction 7.5% 1.8% 2.6% 1.6% 
Inadequate Plan 10.0% 7.0% 25.6% 1.6% 
Priority error 6.3% 8.8% 15.4% 1.6% 
Memory failure 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Fear 1.3% 0.0% 5.1% 3.2% 
Distraction 11.3% 3.5% 7.7% 0.0% 
Fatigue 7.5% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Perform. Variability 5.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Inattention 2.5% 0.0% 5.1% 1.6% 
Physiological Stress 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Psychological Stress 5.0% 1.8% 2.6% 1.6% 
Functional Impairm. 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Cognitive Style 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Cognitive Bias 15.0% 1.8% 10.3% 0.0% 
Equipment Failure 33.8% 22.8% 94.9% 87.1% 
Software Fault 6.3% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Inadeq. Procedure 78.7% 42.1% 38.5% 4.8% 
Access Limitations 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ambiguous Info. 5.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 
Incomplete Info. 36.2% 7.0% 20.5% 1.6% 
Access Problems 3.7% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Mislabelling 2.5% 1.8% 0.0% 1.6% 
Communic. Failure 16.3% 5.3% 20.5% 1.6% 
Missing Information 37.5% 14.0% 15.4% 8.1% 
Maintenance Failure 56.3% 14.0% 33.3% 27.4% 
Inad. Quality Control 81.3% 24.6% 79.5% 56.5% 
Management Prob.  12.5% 5.3% 23.1% 0.0% 
Design Failure 85.0% 50.9% 87.2% 41.9% 
Task Allocation 95.0% 68.4% 48.7% 14.5% 
Social Pressure 17.5% 3.5% 0.0% 1.6% 
Insufficient Skills 56.3% 12.3% 76.9% 6.5% 
Insuffic. Knowledge 60.0% 17.5% 56.4% 6.5% 
Temperature 1.3% 0.0% 2.6% 1.6% 
Sound 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Humidity 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Illumination 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ambient Conditions 2.5% 14.0% 10.3% 4.8% 
Excessive Demand 6.3% 8.8% 5.1% 1.6% 
Work Place Layout 1.3% 7.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Inad. Team Support 6.3% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 
Irreg. Working hours 10.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
However, what makes Cluster 3 remarkably different 
from the remaining groupings is the impact of the 
accidents in terms of fatalities. While Clusters 1, 2 
and 4 presented a fatality rate, respectively, of 4.65, 
1.68 and 4.63 deaths per major accident, Cluster 3 
had a record of 19.71 fatalities per event. It is im-
portant to notice that fatalities figures were not ap-
plied to the SOM algorithm as input data to group 
accidents by any means, implying that the corre-
spondence among these events is exclusively due to 
the contributing factors.  
The results from Cluster 3, which contained the 
most lethal group of events, also suggest a strong 
link between design failures and human errors: all 
accidents involving fatalities in Cluster 3 had a de-
sign fault, and some sort of human error was ob-
served in 81.25% of these cases. As the SOM clus-
tering considered the whole range of specific factors 
(53 in total), it is now possible to relate design fail-
ures with specific human errors, disclosing precise 
erroneous action types and cognitive functions.   
Regarding the analysis of the interfaces between 
design and human factors in Cluster 3 accidents, 
53.84% of the design faults affected complex cogni-
tive functions, influencing the formulation of mental 
plans to understand an unexpected situation. 30.77% 
of the design failures were linked to the human's ca-
pacity to interpret signals and act properly. Finally, 
the remaining 15.38% of design shortcomings were 
associated with the failure to observe a signal and 
recover from the accidental path.  
Simple and fundamental design faults, mostly re-
lated to materials selection or layout, appeared in all 
remaining major events. Examples are the usage of a 
polyvinylchloride pipe to transport inflammable liq-
uids aboveground, instead of steel, or placing hydro-
carbon tanks within the legs of a floating platform, 
severely compromising the maritime unit’s buoyancy 
in case of a tank failure. 
Table 2 lists many cases of design failures linked 
to major accidents with multiple fatalities as grouped 
in Cluster 3, giving detailed information about hu-





Table 2. Examples of correlations between Design Failures and Human Factors in accidents from Cluster 3 
(extracted from MATA-D). 
Id. Design Failure Human Contributing Factors 
1 Poor piping layout, pressure safety valve situation was not 
seen from the protected equipment site. An inspection of the 
safety valve in another location would have been required, in 
order to identify its removal. Poor layout, control room and 
quarters were located close to the compression module, and 
a fire/explosion would affect the response capacity and the 
evacuation of the crew. Fire walls were not blast resistant, 
and there were no redundancy for the deluge system manual 
activation. 
Fire pumps were switched from automatic to the manual 
position aiming at the protection of divers, and when the 
explosion took the control room, it was impossible to acti-
vate them (no redundancy). Faulty diagnosis regarding the 
operational status of the pump (safety valve has been re-
moved). Pump was started before the conclusion of mainte-
nance services. The fire, explosion and collapse of the unit 
resulted in 167 fatalities. 
2 Poor layout of the unit, hot exhaust pipes were located right 
above the riser area. Any hydrocarbon escape was likely to 
generate an explosion. Also, risers were not protected from 
heat or explosion between the waterline and emergency 
shutdown valves. Poor layout of the design change was also 
observed. Service was supposed to install a new accessory 
(pig trap) below shutdown valve. If it was designed to be in-
stalled above the shutdown valve, the service could have 
been carried out in a safer way. 
Shutdown valve was left open (closing it could have limited 
the inventory and restricted the consequences of the explo-
sion to the riser under service). Due to some difficulties to 
remove a blind flange, the riser content was not verified be-
fore cutting. After identifying a marginal condensate leak-
age, operator incorrectly predicted that it would stop and 
continued the cold-cutting service. A very significant con-
densate spray ignited and caused the remaining pipes to 
burst due to the intense heat. The accident resulted in 7 fa-
talities. 
3 The conversion of a drilling unit into a production unit led 
to a poor layout, as hydrocarbon tanks were left in the legs of 
the unit, compromising the structural stability and buoyancy 
in case of an explosion. 
The plan to drain an atmospheric storage tank was flawed, 
as the relief (vent) was sealed while the intake was not iso-
lated. Sealing of the vent was performed before emptying 
the tank, causing the content to scape. Also, oily water was 
often (incorrectly) disposed in the drains tank. The explo-
sion caused 11 fatalities. 
4 Poor well design, no redundancy for hydrocarbon influx bar-
rier in the well (well layout). Production casing was located 
in a way that additional risk of influx was created. 
Plans to optimise operation by using a lock-down sleeve 
valve has brought additional difficulties in critical opera-
tions, including barrier tests. Pressure test was misinterpret-
ed. Failed to observe well fluids balance (in/out) on mud 
tank, a strong indicative of a blowout. After the late detec-
tion of the hydrocarbon flow, it was directed to a mud-gas 
separator, a piece of equipment not designed to handle high 
flow rates. 11 people died as a consequence. 
5 Poor platform layout: riser zone was vulnerable to the load 
zone (inadequate position and poor mechanical and fire pro-
tection); risers were too close as well as contiguous plat-
forms, triggering a domino effect after the rupture. Position 
of the shutdown valve allowed 12km of inventory to fuel the 
fire.  
Supply vessel captain decided to approach the platform 
from windward side, as the leeward crane was not opera-
tional. Approach to the platform was taken too far and the 
vessel collided with risers. 22 fatalities emerged from the 
fire and explosion. 
6 Poor layout, reactors were grouped into identical sets of 
four, increasing the likelihood of human error. Interlock sys-
tem was poorly designed, allowing easy bypass (It was con-
trolled by procedures and training). No mechanism to pre-
vent the opening of pressurised vessels. 
Manager decided not to implement earlier recommenda-
tions to change the valve interlock bypass to reduce poten-
tial misuse. Operator misidentified the vessel he was clean-
ing, overrode the safety valve by connecting an air hose and 
opened the wrong vessel. 5 people died after the massive 
explosion and the destruction of the plant. 
7 Contents of a tunnel to transfer water from a supply system 
was being discharged in a room with limited natural ventila-
tion. Poor design of the ventilation system (discharge system 
was not open to atmosphere; wrong position/layout of vents) 
Operator decided not to open washout valve periodically 
(as recommended) and let it partially opened all the times. 
The intention of his plan was to minimise the discoloration 
of a river every time the valve was fully opened. A void in 
limited the capacity to disperse gas, and allowed the creation 
of an explosive pocket. Concrete-lined tunnel was not de-
signed to be watertight nor positively pressurised, thus 
ground water from the surrounding environment (containing 
natural gas) leaked in the tunnel.  
the tunnel was created, allowing the influx of gas from the 
surrounding formation. The explosion killed 16 people. 
8 Poor layout, a 500-gallon propane tank was located against 
the building external wall, allowing propane to go into the 
administrative building when a release took place, after an 
inadequate plug removal. 
The operator removed too fast a plug from the tank, not al-
lowing sufficient time to observe a small stream of propane 
through the telltale (a hole drilled through the threaded 
plug), which would have gradually exposed a valve leakage. 
4 people died after the destruction of the building. 
9 Poor design (material selection). Aboveground piping for a 
methanol system was from polyvinylchloride (PVC) instead 
of steel or iron. Storage tank contained an aluminium flame 
arrester, which was corroded by the methanol. 
An operator started using a cutting torch on a roof above 
the methanol tank without checking the surrounding atmos-
phere. Vapours coming from the tank were ignited, and the 
flame arrestor failure let the tank explode, killing 2 workers. 
10 Poor design (material selection). The usage of S30400 and 
S31600 alloys for stressed components, associated with the 
chloride and moisture rich atmosphere, led to a catastrophic 
chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking in chrome-nickel 
steel bars supporting a ceiling. Also, there was no structural 
redundancy for the support of the suspended ceiling.  
During a routine inspection, inspectors wrongly attributed 
the observed damage to some construction error, and re-
paired by welding a bar from the same material, without fur-
ther investigation. They ignored the possibility of stress cor-
rosion. The ceiling collapse killed 12 people. 
11 Poor design of a group of three independent sensors, which 
were prone to simultaneous icing. This led to the loss of air-
speed indications in the cockpit of a commercial airplane. 
Facing multiple alarms and error messages and no specific 
unreliable speed detection prompt, the crew was unable to 
diagnose the problem by interpreting the computer output. 
Pilot failed to identify the deviation of the flight path, the 
unreliable airspeed and the approach to stall. Then, failed to 
diagnose the stall situation, lacking actions that would have 
made recovery possible and performing inappropriate con-
trol inputs. Ultimately, pilot had built a wrong mental plan, 
trying to apply at high altitude a control strategy recom-
mended for low attitudes.  
Results largely suggest that most of the design inad-
equacies can be traced back to earlier stages of the 
design development, where a basic design correction 
– i.e. changing the facilities’ layout or better specifi-
cation of materials employed – would be viable if 
detected on time by a reviewing process. 
5 DISCUSSION 
 
The significance of design failures as a major acci-
dents contributor and its connections with human er-
rors have been highlighted by the events grouped in 
Cluster 3. The accidents from this cluster undoubted-
ly brought the deepest consequences to human life, 
represented by a fatality rate of 19.71 deaths per 
event, the most significant figures among all group-
ings by far. Cluster 3 also contained the largest fig-
ures for design failures (87.5%). 
The scrutiny of the interfaces among design fail-
ures and other contributing factors can help estab-
lishing mechanisms to manage design from a hazard 
mitigation perspective.  
A general checklist, presented in the bullet points 
below, can be derived from the findings of this work. 
The checklist is intended to guide designers and the 
people responsible for reviews in the search for 
problems, design shortcomings and improvement 
opportunities. Good examples are the correlations 1, 
2 and 8 in Table 2, which inspired the first and the 
second bullet recommendations to designers, regard-
ing layout (distances among modules and protection 
of the control room). The third and fourth bullet 
points derived from the correlation number 6, and so 
on. 
Therefore, a reasonable start point would be to fo-
cus on the layout or general arrangement of the de-
signed facility, taking into account the following les-
sons learned from Cluster 3 accidents:   
• Accommodation, resting and leisure facilities, 
administrative offices and parking spaces, 
must be located within a safe distance from 
the process facilities and any hazardous ma-
terials; 
• Control rooms must be protected from dam-
age and located within a safe distance from 
the process plants. A scenario of control 
room loss must be included in safety anal-
yses, and redundancy of emergency controls 
(e.g. fire control system, shutdown systems) 
must be designed;  
• Reactors, vessels and equipment arrangement 
and dimensions should take into considera-
tion a perception perspective, being visually 
distinctive to allow a human operator to dif-
ferentiate them immediately, e.g. by the posi-
tion, size or colour. 
• Electrical, mechanic and hydraulic connectors 
should not be interchangeable among differ-
ent systems or functions – any inadvertent 
connection must be avoided by design.  
• The isolation indication of safety valves 
meant to protect equipment and systems 
against overpressure must be directly observ-
able from the protected equipment, and inad-
vertent operation must be prevented by me-
chanical barriers; 
• Ignition sources (e.g. exhaustion, electrical 
equipment) must be located away from pip-
ing carrying significant amounts of hazard-
ous materials, or in a position in which igni-
tion is minimised in case of leakage; 
• Strategies to limit the released inventory in 
case of piping leakage must be provided, 
such as the installation of automatic emer-
gency shutdown valves (ESDVs). Surround-
ing equipment should withstand a release fol-
lowed by a jet fire for the inventory depletion 
time, i.e. the time to consume the combus-
tible between two safety valves; 
• Mechanical protection should be provided 
where collisions and explosions are possible; 
• Distance among adjacent equipment should 
be sufficient to avoid domino effects and es-
calation. Blast and fire protection should be 
considered;  
• Safety barriers prone to common cause fail-
ures should be considered to be a single bar-
rier. The same concept applies to sensors and 
alarms. If alarms and sensors are subjected to 
the same failure modes, e.g. same power 
supply, they cannot be considered redundant; 
• Design should consider redundancy as fully 
independent safety barriers to protect systems 
or structures from critical scenarios; 
• Where the creation of explosive atmospheres 
is likely, safety measures should be provided, 
such as the installation of deluge or inerting 
(CO2 or N2) systems; exhaustion/vents, if the 
flammable source is confined; usage of posi-
tively pressurised rooms, paths or tunnels 
and/or provide automatic shutoff for air in-
lets, if the flammable source is external; 
• In case of an accident scenario, a safe evacua-
tion path including anti-blast and fire walls 
must be provided. The escape route must 
contain indication if it is clear for use, by 
visual and audible alarms. Manual alarm 
switches to alert the remaining workers to 
evacuate the plant should be also provided; 
In addition, the observed interfaces between de-
sign flaws and human behaviour indicated some im-
provement points, as listed below. 
• To minimise the result of delayed or improp-
er responses from operators (such as in ex-
amples 4 and 11), systems must be designed 
to interpret strong signals and respond 
promptly. When signals (e.g. significant 
changes in fluids in/out balance in a well or 
multiple alarms) can be translated in a clear 
action (automatic shut-in), the system must 
act autonomously; 
• Situations involving multiple alarms are es-
pecially prone to automatization, as the varie-
ty of alarms and signals are likely to cause 
many adverse effects in human behaviour. 
Humans may tend to take into account only 
the information which confirms their as-
sumptions (i.e. a confirmation bias), select a 
wrong objective to stabilise the system or use 
incorrect criteria to diagnose the situation. 
When an automatized action is not applica-
ble, the system should be able to provide sin-
gle and clear messages to help diagnosing the 
problem; 
Lastly, problems related to material selection are 
likely to be minimised if the following recommenda-
tions are taken into consideration. 
• The chemical and mechanical properties of 
materials should be compatible with the envi-
ronment and the product carried (case of 
pipelines), to avoid corrosion, chemical at-
tack, mechanical damage and other effects; 
Also, the design should take into considera-
tion the environment temperature and the ex-
pected interaction among materials with dif-
ferent temperature gradients; 
• Protection between different commercial al-
loys must be provided, to avoid galvanic cor-
rosion. This includes the interfaces between 
equipment and its supports and fixation 
parts; Also, pipelines, elbows and connectors 
from distinct materials should be differenti-
ated by dimension or thread type during de-
sign, to avoid parts interchangeability in an 
industrial plant; 
• Special attention should be devoted to the 
possibility of stress corrosion cracking in 
stainless steels. The right nickel content of 
the alloy for the environment should be de-
fined, and further control measures (e.g. 
stress relieve or cathodic protection) should 
be designed, when practical; 
• Corrosion mechanisms emerging from the 
saturation of wet hydrocarbons with dis-
solved carbon dioxide and sour environments 
should also be carefully considered. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This work presented a straightforward framework, in 
a checklist format, for a design verification scheme, 
aiming at the avoidance of human errors through the 
design enhancement. The lessons arose from a selec-
tion of major accidents where design shortcomings 
interfaced with human errors to result in multiple fa-
talities. 
The several examples described in Table 2, all ex-
tracted from Cluster 3, emphasised that improving 
the management of earlier stages of the design pro-
cess could generate substantial opportunities to re-
duce human errors and the overall risk. Many of the 
design shortcomings revealed by this research were 
mostly associated with features usually defined when 
the system is in a premature phase, where many op-
portunities for design improvement are open.  
Therefore, an effective design review method 
should be able to address broad issues such as lay-
out, material selection and the design of alarms and 
emergency interfaces, especially in a phase of the fa-
cility’s lifecycle where the cost of changes are signif-
icantly lower, i.e. from conception to detailed engi-
neering and before construction. 
The list is also intended to raise the designers’ 
and design reviewers’ general risk awareness, by de-
livering a logical and direct method to learn from 
major accidents and to apply the information in risk 
mitigation strategies, in a very practical way.  
7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
This study was partially funded by CAPES (Proc. nº 
5959/13-6). 
8 REFERENCES 
Evans, A. 2011. Fatal train accidents on Europe's railways: 
1980-2009, Accident Analysis and Prevention 43: 391-401. 
Baysari, M., McIntosh, A. and Wilson, J. 2008. Understanding 
the human factors contribution to railway accidents and in-
cidents in Australia, Accident Analysis and Prevention 40: 
1750-1757. 
Bellamy, L.J. et al., 2007. Storybuilder - A Tool for the Analy-
sis of Accident Reports, Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety. 92: 735–744. 
Bellamy, L.J. et al., 2013. Analysis of underlying causes of in-
vestigated loss of containment incidents in Dutch Seveso 
plants using the Storybuilder method. Journal of Loss Pre-
vention in the Process Industries 26: 1039–1059. 
Boy, G. A. 2013. Orchestrating human-centered design. Lon-
don: Springer. 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Europe. 2016. Ger-
many train crash: Human error to blame, says prosecutor. 
BBC World News, 16 February 2016. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35585302. 
Doell, C., Held, P., Moura, R., Kruse, R., and Beer, M. 2015. 
Analysis of a major-accident dataset by Association Rule 
Mining to minimise unsafe interfaces. Proceedings of the 
International Probabilistic Workshop (IPW2015), Liver-
pool, UK, November 4-6, 2015. 
Hollnagel, E. 1998. Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd. 
Kohonen, T. 2001. Self-Organizing Maps. 3rd ed. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Kohonen, T. 2013. Essentials of the self-organizing map. Neu-
ral Networks 37: 52–65. 
Kurosu, M. 2011. Human centered design. Proceedings of the 
second international conference, HCD 2011, held as part 
of HCI International 2011, Orlando, USA, July 9-14, 2011. 
Heidelberg: Springer. 
Moura, R., Beer, M., Patelli, E., Lewis, J. & Knoll, F. 2015a. 
Human error analysis: Review of past accidents and impli-
cations for improving robustness of system design, Pro-
ceedings of the 24th European Safety and Reliability Con-
ference, 14–18 September 2014, Wroclaw: 1037-1046. 
London: Taylor & Francis Group. 
Moura, R., Beer, M., Patelli, E., Lewis, J. & Knoll, F. 2015b. 
Learning from Accidents: Analysis and Representation of 
Human Errors in Multi-attribute Events. Proceedings of the 
12th International Conference on Applications of Statistics 
and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP12 Vancouver, 
Canada, July 12–15, 2015. 
Moura, R., Beer, M., Doell, C., Kruse, R. 2015c. A Clustering 
Approach to a Major-Accident Data Set: Analysis of Key 
Interactions to Minimise Human Errors. Proceedings of the 
2015 IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelli-
gence (SSCI2015), Cape Town, South Africa, December 8-
10, 2015. 
Moura, R., Beer, M., Patelli, E., Lewis, J. & Knoll, F. 2016. 
Learning from major accidents to improve system design, 
Safety Science 84: 37-45. 
Reason, J. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Acci-
dents. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Swain, A.D. 1990. Human Reliability Analysis—Need, Status, 
Trends and Limitations. Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety 29: 301–313. 
Ultsch, A. 1993. Self-organizing neural networks for visualiza-
tion and classification. In Opitz, O., Lausen, B., Klar, R. 
(eds.). Information and Classification:307-313. Berlin: 
Springer. 
 
 
 
 
